BOOK 9-2011

Read Notebreach Briefs Books

BURR ✓ { NESC-2009 (google: NESC Marshall)
✓ { NSSM-3 ? YHH mss? My notes?

FVWhipple: L-file refs?

FAS: Hons

✓ Krieger – blonde! (Krieger + Folk book)

? Chris Paine

Romberg – send (read)

✓ Find bst account

Find Kaplan (answers)

to behead
Boo hj to prosecute
to investigate & impeach

WHO can behead climate problem?

OR NUC PROBLEM? [BIG kill (=Kill): CRIME DISASTROUS POLICY

see WWI War Plans

[Who could have behind the warning cries about the financial storm/ multi-dem?

The breadth & scale of criminality?

(see Bernie Madoff)

see GG 11-26-11 on Wesley Clark 2007 on neo-cons, PNAC: 1991, 2001

or Federation Tsarnomi:

(see GWOT – drug, torture, rendition, detention... Afghan war!

or, DOD budget does it work to stop, or less?

Cost/benefit compared to other uses of money?

Who knows most? Has any of the Told?

(You alone really know what is/was on the President mind – his concerns, fears, influences, aims,

"We meant to win" (MP scientists)

NSC-68?

RAND:

1) after all, if Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev (Beyond) had been = Hitlers in geopolitical ambition:
to control Western Europe!
+ Berlin! and ME!
CA! CA!
(and China / SEA / Indonesia ...!
Australia

2-266 2) If they had had a crash bomber program
(+ refueling ...)

R-290+ 3) If they had built ICBMs as USAF projected
+ Hounds + Rush ...
(& sent 200 ICBMs on Cuba!

1956 4) If they had been determined to start on testing
(Kaltura

1960? 5) If they had big effective CD program, blent
ABM; SS-18 ... SS-20's + Hardening
[If the assumption of Soviet Evil, + this threat,
were not defining [Pipes: "Portrait of
Jew B Neo-Nazi
(or formulated — as it was...

9-2011

than USAF/RAND

/

which did "outhurt" Polaris, + Cong/USMC

not the B-70 hooked-up with VFK

(WWK?)

not FU (or limited nuc war)

not HK (on the whole, for RAND;

or FS; he was our guy,

a public face!)

We did critique vulnerability — like Bucher!

+ we tried to disarm it

(not my face!) DO for an USAF could do!

(while accepting US 21 land-based forces, OF

fast-reactor (though: hawkish

WWK-led influence control — or ours

on MCN! (our Bizarre Days) it real!

me? (or pacts in optimal (anti "face!") me delegation +

FS plan Kenan

optimal retal? and forces PALs

+ rejecting Ours Control, really!

RIGHT: TOTAL WITHHOLD (like Bucky, Hans?!

like Withdrawal or reductions

from VN, Afghan, Iraq, (+ our Letters: vs. CTB!

Physics Div. for MIRV

Bonds/US did not need 624 Polaris subs!

(any one : 10?
like China)

(Well, if SU went for Rumsfeld 1000?
STOP that : with imputed agreement
POSSIBLE

(K should have gone for Reagan's proposal—
but he right will have lost effect
(though submitted by Sakharov,
while

as it was, US received ABM argument
and how need start treaty
have to close, in 20 years?!
no real answers!

OK, Sakharov was right;
Gor, not A, were wrong.

(But would it have backfired? 1986...
CR out in 1987...

Don Graham!

9-11

The minority reports did not debunk any + many estimates!

vs, in the end, Gates on the

This case?

E: (Hamilton, Rumsfeld ≈ Tom B! AUW!

vs. Any/Many

PRIME CASE: the intentions of "objective ambiguity" (then my/our pursuing estimates — strongly motivated, weighted with range of estimates (strongly held; true data:)

So: why were CIA, INR so wrong?!

(USAF, easy to overturn)

(a big function of CIA!)

= WMD's

Well, K didn't help!

(WJ didn't be vocal about vs-Many!

Big that into after, for sure!

(UNCOATSIOUSLY: subjectively, "unbiased, objective"

Did he realize: it was not enough to date US?!

He was right to worry about US giving arms to Many — that was not paranoid, about us!

But did he need to worry about Many with arms?

Need to examine,

Tom Thornton

Stories:

"Three frig ~~boats~~ all want to A/S" — WWK/Power

& have all the answers.

WWK — better than a man & a woman & Power

Lefty to me

McN to me Yours

— writing on Cuba

— Econ Chuck

Containing China

Koster, Chinese bank (BSR and...) / Cargo Boxtops
McN and

(Johnson: like a drunken assassin.
Moscow Embassy bugging

Schandler & 206K Book

Tonkin Gulf fraud

Lying in State 1968, 1969

Escalate effort...
Nov 22...

Red in Alexandria (Hungary?)

US delegation: NATO, CINCs

What if bombs do come? What then, dreams?

Moscow as target

in Cuba! (BMSP!)

Wf act in SU?! Wf dif!

agonal ark? What if Tokyo in WW II?

effects?: (No surrender!

suicide?

Banking

Zoolint fantasy — dropping explosives

(Satellite? 1946?

Harris, LeMay

Billy Mitchell

Darlet

"How to win" — LeMay quote

Football me!

attacks on cities:

must really be

total, alt. warheads

JFK wants his Chief!

Power — Tokyo — Zoolint

Korea (killed 2-3 M)



Trying to — 1. Hit (SO) missiles when a) non-alert (non-fueled)
or b) before ~~planes~~ missiles taken off
c) all bases taken off

2. Hit SO airfields when (a) one base taken off
(b) one base taken off
c) all bases taken off

3. Destroy industry and ~~pop~~ to work

9-4-11

USAF Requirements

1. Air Superiority
   Command of the Air
   no fighters or AA (& SAMs) threatening
   an a/c can bomb at will, no defenses
   no risk
   (Korea? ordered in Korea? ordered in Japan
   (Navy blockade
   or air)
   VN, Korea, Iraq, Afghan,
   Pakistan (drones!), Libya

   ↓

   not ordered in Cuba-I!
   a/c for C-II
   a/c for SU
   (1A) FIRST BLOW (Doubt / on CITIES originally based on assessment of damage to hdq or effect of damage (A-bombs, etc., on real damage of WMD to mil. + cities
2. Superior Airpower: flights attacks range defenses (e.g. electronic (maneuverability speed, alt. bomb-load speed WMD double radar, SAMs, fighters)

   ↓

Perry? 3. Large R+D industry (Civil Air

   ↓

   ↓

4. Large Air Force

Legal Air Force — "60-wing" (1944) on —
groups"

4. (Also good for promotions, flight pay, large officer corps, budget (and political influence; bases, MIC, votes, contributors, lobbyists.

But especially good for MIC: (Profits; anti-federal uniformed identity

Industries

(Nuc labs +

Commercial air

(R+D, airframes subsidized; and large production lines, low cost

↓

N

5. Independent Air Force

— to free it from Army ground support, training missions

small, slow, (training — tactical drones)

low-flying, short-range, small bomb-load planes (+ missiles)

(for Army; + carrier)

— to free it for S.B.

— training weapon, drawing, training (Army absorbs; low budget

(get budget share away from Army + Navy)

— SB doctrine rationalizes (14) 3,4,5 (with, aligned)

Independent USAF allows "bribing" to upbuild S.B. + LARGE AF, R+D

Brits (6): challenge of maintaining lead is more SB
when opponent has nukes

new 6-Day War
trend;

Japan = Pearl
(Reds to get cunning!)
and Paris

new Cuba II

FS — First Blow — becomes essential to
winning — but not sufficient to win!
(even 90% success is not good
enough to permit deterrence).
99% can be achieved : FS
(unless 1) SU is totally non-alert
and (2) decoy works!
No deception
or Dead Hand
(and (3) Europe to Europe "don't count"
(C) (D) High level of "acceptable" damage
to US — 10 million + more!

(C) + (D) require that alternative to FS (~~NATO + Europe~~)
looks even worse than losing 10 M in US
and more in Europe
(and causing fallout deaths
in region + world!) STOP
(Argue cases in which SIOP-62 looks
worth doing! even with 0 cas. in US
(really possible in 1958–62: NOT now then!)
Berlin, Taiwan Straits, Cuba I + II
(Berlin; " " 1955, Aug

—NK argues this is true (assuming 10M dead in US)
(and Eur destroyed.
What is the CO program
for Eur?!
to Eur a SU Base
or not?
(with Scand, for NK.
or Eur subject to SU
conventional attack, i
A – orgn of US mem[illegible]
or Berlin is Cuba II
(a dist. to JFK)
(or Turk missiles)
(What did KS think about Berlin
or Turkey, in Oct-62?
Were thy confident of US
Type II sub/det? (or # were?!
hsr?
Why didn't one worry so much
about Berlin? GILPATRIC: FS! '61 '62
(Front Stat arrivals!
"No response")
If this played in 64 – after
SU found ICBMs, subs...
(NK could then put in FROGS
TO PROTECT Cuba – only – thought
he could hide some under the for
SU the

NK agrees: wants change (limited of CD ☆ ban with SU ~~NATO~~ states)

Critics

to prevent SU takeover of Europe!

(our actual policy — unknown to US public! (basis is "NFU" — or should be NFU) — somehow accepted by Europe!

and the "confident SU will be deterred (esp by a European nuclear force (NATO as (SUICIDE BOMBER)

2) like to find confidence - local control & US commander low-level commands

3) so as not to have to spend more on conventional defense

(Jervis Committee 1984;

Goldwater

(= K 1962)

But this doesn't sell in US.

- Argument on CD (+ ABM)
- Implausible that Europe matters that much to SU

The worst Evil action
Goes to be on SU FS vs. US
which
a) is large, against cities, prop.
(larger than they can threaten
in 2nd strike)
and thus b) is non-countervail

(McN in Atlas + Gen Anders suggested
want to encourage them to focus on
countervail actions (WWR, DB, TCS) weaken
FS or S-S (unused strike)

But a) any chance of that? SU doctrine?
(Even getting with AC to forgo
drop. is close to impossible!
Was that ever implemented on US side
as option?
If they had ordered it, could he
get it?
(Could he keep PACOM from hitting
China? Cities?)

grasping actual
backwards?!

(b) How do you deter countervail strike?
Either By promising to retain minimal survivable forces
1) much larger than theirs [Kahn later: 1961]
SU vs. US or 2) promising a homicidal, non-countervail retal?
[almost unimaginable: 1) fragile C³; 2) drunks;

carrier attack (by US, Nice) can be argued to dominate non-carrier FS (except if decoys can succeed! which USAF (Schlesinger!) counts on, WRONGLY!) (+ pulverize SU!)

If you have survivable SS force ⇒ FS = Polaris.

(did SU, ~1961? USA with

— ⓑ might work, to end war, even upon an ultimatum (or if Cities are hit) from full SU attack.

BUT ⓑ works only if both sides suspect for real exploration carrier threat: survivable C^3 (not any quick bilateral attack, decoys) but

(Decoys: the chief objective of USAF (SUSAC?) in WWII, an atomic monopoly! (Not available in WWII; (why was Ephron's Polaris spared — except for oriental stories, effective! in May, '45 — ?

But 1st (⇒ 3d) target for nukes! in WWIII USA (Not 1st ⇒ 2d: convert downtown to dumps, in Tokyo!)

exhale

± spend against this fictional air!)

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√ Wf didn't we wage frontier wars?

NOT: "We're too dense"; "not American Wy" — NOT PEACE (committed to the end...)
"We were deterred by the prospect
— of killing SU civs" NO

— of killing too many Russians NO
(mil + civ)
— of killing (& failing) too many, or
others NO
(normal sense of Nikolski + Brodie: Offutt, 1960)

— of losing (to SU intel) too many
Europeans NO (1)

to attain something (a just cause)

— deterred by prospect of SU communist
occupation of Europe.
(We expropriated this, but still, provided for SD.
We planned to behind Ger & NATO
(intent & US troops permanently!
Kirkham goods
Potentially unattainable.
US Gov never could do it: but at
remnant of Europe (& early '50's)

[W/ drab OM ~~come to be~~ built Cabins 18+ /M

+ kept up ~~on~~ after points

~~on~~ after end of CW
= division of ~~the~~ wire
(wire left end CW
effort on Hardware)

√ Views implemented: 1) MAD
accepted, assumed:
or "dot only"
By USAF 2) "Riding out attack." (for MM, MX)

(see MM launch control:
ability of 1 Center (2 men)
or 1 man
(hunt Khrom: can this get around
"bullet-proof glass"? Sanctions?
(can't one disarm the other,
+ say "if you don't GO, I'll" (come around
at) kill you"? Look as if there were
no plans! (Then, if you can't then
GO, how does he explain? by the
other had threatened?)

√ 3) Sheltering bombers (AWW)
~~A-S~~
S-S was not their priority;
other methods favored (alert,
"Pins on shelter" warning,
in short

√ 4? (? Forging droop.? Moscow?
Carrying threat? Pershing cities?
(Afghan,

5) (Forging LOW)

Axioms: of USAF

1) — What's good for SAC/USAF
is good for US/World

(re: Evil-doer

Compare whose plans/actions
need justification:
the risk of human deaths
" catastrophe
mixed crime,
or lying
"It's not just for me, or a narrow "us";
it's for others
a larger group for whom
I/we also feel concern, loyalty

Mafia, Union, Corp., USG, Gain, Party
Candidate, America, Israel

2) "What's good for US $ is good for: GM
+ evil empire.
= There is an identity of interest, Romney campaign
No potential (at least, most of the time,
as rule of thumb)
conflict of interest

Ken Blanchard: What's good for Dems/Left (e.g. McCain Am. in 2008)
or Mount or 3d party → Republic

mafia ✓ as in "What's good for Israel 5)
is good for the Jews
and alt " " " "
is good for America

✓ 2) Conflict of interest operates (has its effect)
by causing a mis-perception of
absence of potential or actual
conflict

NOT by making the (narrow, previous,
"official," conceptual or role/intent
("of one"). over the broader interest,
which supposedly, in turn of affairs, rule,
law, public expectation is "supposed
to be superior, centrally

but by causing the office-holder or
actor that the one corrupt or identical,
there is no meaning trade-off for one
vs. the other

Whether intent is legit to calculate
or estimate or predict is a notable point
to the other intent

and since one is more familiar
(and more subject to certain clarity
alty, certain constituency — your boss (or court)
employer, to whom you all return, or our industry

answerable to agency, of
(your Church, your boss, your
industry or corporation (Wall St. ...)
your family, your landlord

you can't fulfill your responsibilities to
God other or larger or nominally religious
groups or any thought by attaching to it
by "turning on" what's good for
your old/other/own interests
(or what your normal functions & routine demands).

"Women, Jews or poor people"
(vs. "country" — biggest moral swindle)

(Israel vs. US? — threat or Arm
— occupied territories (Anti-Israel/UN
— hostile relations with Arabs
(+UN)

— new thinking

anti-all-hostile — All "ways we might fight Russians" (Air, Chinese in Korea; Stevens)

"US must maintain STABILITY" 9-4-11 13

NEVER: NFU NFS (Expand "No preemption" ?) 2)

— Type I Deterrence (of SU all-out) attack on US as the goal or driving objective of USAF ‖ ("NUCs only light use is to deter FS & other" ? or formidable, RATIONAL cont. threat

D-C impossible, FU always too risky/incredible FS "incredible" threat + FU)

NOT BLUFF ALWAYS being: 1948 budget

USAF goal 0. major (unlimited) USAF (+R&D, command in, MIC) nationhood & role of S.B.

"US" goal SAC 1. Deterring or responding to SU invasion of Europe (despite SU nukes: after 1949/54)

(Russia USSR: 2) habit./recon inform in Europe;

(SU threat Magnified.) #) NATO: cooperative Euro nuclear Nexus (replaced by Marshall)

(1) (non-Left, non-Russian-controlled) East Euro

3) maintain divided Europe;

West Germ, Normal (see (1))

Berlin (see (4)

4) Monitor (expand? generally for one of Rebels) Pull-back?

US informal empire, "Free World" (lie, ideology?

"Open Door" (& US)

by threat or execution of FU = Euro (Trade)

This regime — vs. SU ally — credible threat of US FS (as implied of (2))

(4) to deter SU Tac (LNW) response to US FU

(Berlin, Indochina, Korea, Arm, Iraq, 1958 Taiwan, offshore Islands)

(& Prevent DOMINOS OR ACCOMODATION)

or ~~xxx~~

It is hard to convince US public that SU regional superiority to US FU is worth ("worse than") US FS!

(not hard to convince MIC — (unions...)
Congress, not hard to convince Pres / Congress that this should be structured and purchased for!

but in the event/crisis, it would be hard to convince Pres, especially

when combined with fear of big attack first by SU — fear of SU deception — but this focuses/reorients fear away from SU FS cap —

fear vulnerability of US FS forces to existing SU FS forces

and win war — INSTABILITY

so that a SU FS attack might look better to SU than suffering US FS

(assumes that US would use a counter strategy if FS does not work this!
SU FS would be inferior for SU than SU S-S!
But SU would probably not be aware of this!)

i.e. instability is not only "better" than stability for the deterrence of SU limited response to US FU, it is essential.

(This is consistent with — if not conscious cover of —
USAF ~~mission~~ to ~~achieving~~ strategic ~~stability~~
or ~~reversing vulnerability~~
relative vulnerability & SU attack:
land-based missiles

as ~~an~~ to bring SU offensive forces
~~reduced~~ to level that does not threaten
US forces

∑ ~~the effort~~ of Herbert 1987? ~~efforts~~
~~reducing~~ TANKS in East Europe!
Need to justify US FU
& US buying in Europe!
"Warsaw the Real Nazis"!

What if Russia adopted posture of
China — min. det.?
How justify SAC?

— So — new (until 1989?) accepts
~~stability~~ stability as arms goal.

5) D-L (mood-stroke) "if" SU stalls first!

(McN accepts — as of 1964, "MAD" —
as strategy goal:
"up to the level that can be ordered
by existing forces — from 1964
— rationalized (vs. Kahn) the
which could have been formulated by
stability vs cost and reduction of U's ability
(U grants) on SU forces, & non-firing
at substantially improvable
(without arousing public alarm),
fight with Soviet
MIC
Congress
is conflict with — Soviet Society
and — VN (see above
(created by Kent Society
+ LBJ historical sign
+ "unlocked door" if act, reduction
(see fight on Dissolution + VN — which LBJ won
(while nearly agreeing with both)
virginal fight if he had tried to
reduce forces, as in program
(Really achievable from 1964 on — Begun
if not too late, after K assassination!)
OR FROM SEPT. 1961 JFK

(NO IRAQ WMD'S!
NIE (PILLAR,)
DURBIN...

LOST OPPORTUNITY:
LIKE H-BOMB-TEST BAN
1950/1952
late first: GERMAN
NO ~~RUSSIAN~~ MC/A!
(fall 1944, Rotblat "couldn't
(thanks from him: SZILARD. But he didn't know. (AUGUST?
EINSTEIN FRANCK

D-L — whether FS or S-S — is correlated with
earliness of arrival on (mil.) targets
— better earliness of launch (+ speed of arrival:
see missiles
+ Polaris / IRBMs
(Gen. II)

this is instead of reducing chance of warning,
improving sensors (e.g. MIDAS - infrared)
+ reliability (reducing inaccuracy,
accuracy, discrimination

(see Kaplan to Yarmolinsky for COW!)

but also: acceptance of danger to US, if false
or if real, but response is delayed
(this can be reduced, but esp.
if early launch — acceptance of
ambiguity (e.g. of first warning

the: any fights with Soviets will be
— treated as equivalent to certainty
of SU attack on US!
(1% Doctrine!)
— after all, any significant conflict with SU
will (be certain to) lead to all-out
(nuclear war, will end.

for future planning and
of planning

unite

McN to say, 1961: any tac-nucs in Europe will be all-out for Europe: during Berlin

(McN concern for Europe:

Army, DD US BU (in Europe; anywhere?)

and to NATO than-nuc buildup

(the injection of budget

Berlin " " "

like CNW in Europe (Eur assumes it is formally committed, after the!) 1964

We did not assume, conflict in Europe (esp, SU tac nucs?) → US FS inevitable (but, in C-II he did assume it!)

(That did not encourage McN to plan for US FS, instead; but, in 1961-62, to threaten US conventional attack (eg BNSP, eg Kahn/Hitch approach: A did foreclose/discourage this, as of 1961-62 (C-II) that

(A would not have supported operation of this in 1961 — like Kaysen/Bissell/WWK — convinced it rejected by JFK.

McN thinks?

JCS " ?

Nitze " ?

Hitch ?

(convinced in Cuba-II?)

(Where was Kaysen, or WWK, in C-II?

(Gilpatric "breakdown?)

to undo D-L work on S-S, USAF wants LOW

For FS (all other cases) — SU non-use vs. Berlin
SU invasion of Europe
SU knows Sov know
into Europe
SU responds to US FU

"Days of Thunder"
Speed: "almost out of control"
("But it IS out of control")
Rules of cars...

Jeopardy: Russian Roulette

to get US Pres to carry out US FS threat
you need a prob. of SU FS

i.e. "strat. warning" of SU FS
(intentions)
OR FALSE WARNING of SU FS

Either factor or true warning of SU FS
will be ambiguous.

To get either responded to by US Pres (civ)
you need
2) — to assure his damage to US will be limited (much less than under SU FS without CF D-L)
(on Notice to McN
prob. if done only Nitze version)
(on warning, not with-out)
3) ability to look at "best-case of response,
"worst-case" (left-end)
of prob./range of SU attack)

c) Immediately, get Pres to delegate to military figure commander who will do this: high-level, or better, team-level

✓

✓

X Thus, a Joint team, with delegation (or UA) (or Dual Hat: Keane to Yoest, Kelly to me) (or to Rudel: P-P-P substitute)

is better basis for US "Adaptation" than true team/warning

and frigate-like stunt-corvettes

Plinder's pronouncements

(see Tankin Ref or Ref. 18)

At outset SU forces before the bases selected deployed & deployed

and before the bases locked bases or Airbases

(or before Dual Hat has been activated)

and before the bases armed,

dealing US OS or any forces

visual, but for US "writing on SU (+ Chinese Cons)

give US civ/Pres willingness to launch preventive war, in cases when by Pres as head of non-Euro SU FS (or Adaptation)!

√ This rests on a different/conflict/gap

between what i) USAF/SAC will "accept"
in limits on risk a cont of US cas

ii) and what Pres will accept
or needs to know
on limits/constr

iii) and what US Public (or elsin)
will accept.

or conversely: what each of them needs to
know re risk of SU attack

before launching a US FS

("critical risk")

and see "might pin & invent
cost and/or limit cons in pitches
of type of funds, and quit"

USAF (LeMay) cannot get Pres (or Pub)
to accept Soviet cas (& prob. of
SU attack in near Term, absence of overt conflict
in 50's, or later.

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✓ bases, to deploy SU Regions

Deploy: "Assumption" FS
"FS by Rotation"

~~Each~~ with retention of

1) US FU with unit of ~~the~~

✓ or 2) Rotational, with forces by
Pres or, worst-case w/ ongoing
~~Notional to/as if~~ ("I/S deploy)
or delegation/retention
and/or allies ~~committed~~ action to Rotate
when
Rotational up of all-out FS
(Strategic)

or 3) allies alone can, without Rotation
(Strategic)

USAF ~~AAF~~ + USG (the) (note: minimum)
Response capacity for 1 or 2)
and allows (plus bias) for (3)
+ rejection of cuts)

while keeping hostility (worldwide
land-based forces, ~~Navy~~ Navy on
worldwide warning (guilty, more by Russia
+ Alone by Assumption (S-S D-L by cuts, FS by USAF + INC)

11:30
3 Dec

✓ Realities (Soviet, unchanged/Expanded/Expanded, hard core, generally (probably) unchanged, Misunderstood) (2)

USAF/USG

(the realist Option)

NOTE: NFU NFs anti-all nuclear weapons controls vs. UA (2-man rule) PALs

"Worst Case": Pres. believes D-L, perceives Soviets as (like C-E!)

+

1) - USAF (SIOP Planning) emphasis on FS (not interd. & SU FS)

2) - USG goals subject on Credi. of US FS (+ FU)

3) - certain Leaders (anti-Com, anti-Russian, who want US FS, vs. SU & China + WANT EXTERMINATION OF COMS (OR RUSSIANS

(a Kadafy, capo; dissenter?)

(JAPANESE) (not Humans!)

4) - need to disagree 2 + 3 as "unrealistic" for Realists (+ SWB: wow, hang!)

5) - Construction of Invulnerability: Maintenance (a basic Aim: if SU, no initiation? points + SU MIC) (Pol-Russia?!

Unilateral required unworkable: better!

[6) Promotion of Peace (compare Hoffman Report + Rusk, McN, Harriman, Pol., other Americans

No analysis, hyp:

not publicly discussed/promoted (b) bec

— When you have a risk of catastrophic but chosen, and/or maintained, [illegible] on the

It is almost NEVER due because (as usually claimed,
— "No one has foreseen happening" etc.)
— It was not imagined, or foreseeable
— No one warned — (with authority
— No one [illegible] to avert possibility"
— There was (Am) NO WAY TO LOVE (") RISK

— but note: choice + maintenance work chosen despite available warnings of grim RISK and foreseeable

— as a conscious (absent) gamble

["conscious"]

— (absent to avoid blame, if catastr. occurs, or because gamble could not have been warranted to some "outsiders in larger audience, or those impacted, "stakeholders"

and [illegible] could controversy, abundant compromise or pay-offs. risky for officials, possible loss of office

(this is not assuming intelligent, though "undemocratic" (re FDR/WWII)

But reason

— Yet D lacking (wrongness to believe) this finding and its drawing (despite his, career disputes) is for the good of D, the longer group: good CONSCIENCE (one realm option).

(c)

OR gamble is wantly chosen because the possible benefit of doing it, and/or its foreseeable actions, is seen by decision-maker(s) as "worth" the risk of catastrophe.

Why is this not supported to be accepted unambiguously (without contempt, disdain) if known publicly, backed?

2) D (decision-maker) values the benefit of omit/delay or of its actions more highly (relative to catastrophe) than others do

(sending officials/forces; embarking it; arming bombs, but images: bombers, missiles, warheads/warning ...)

OR (d) SEES MEASURES NECESSARY TO AVERT OR LOWER RISK OF CATAS. AS "TOO COSTLY!!" (SECURITY)

CLIMATE OR MIN. DET. STABILITY (re. ICBMs)

b) D sees risk as less than others do (TO SELF, or STATES) not but

(With Cuban Missile Crisis: Kennedy: right! Russia: wrong)

my skepticism, mode of thought

c) D sees catastrophe as less bad (for his, his party) than others do — sees some benefit in it (not actually "good" but desired) environment — dominantly, distinctively

[McCain writing ~ 2008, for Dems/Kyoto/caution; GWB writing ~ 2000/04 (Nader, 3rd Party)

KEY INSTANCE: FALSE ALARM & TYPE II "ERROR" → "unnecessary

Thus, a false alarm leading to Type II error is preferable to "prompting" war not necessary, objectively 9-4-11 26

leading to ⇒ US FS in Non-Crisis (or Crisis, but not ABOUT TO ATTACK, but more likely) OR DESIRED BY PRES, - when SU is NOT

(Standard)

⇒ ONLY OPPORTUNITY FOR US "victory," at low, or "acceptable" (to USAF, Boards) cost

Thus, a "Type II error" is "bad" action for US, + wasted
i.e. type of USAF

and the "cost" of "winning and building" to MIC

kill "non-rational" to Armaments Industry

(or Vioxx, drugs dog, to Pharma.

see having "bubble" computer " S+C " and Ponzi scheme, under-valuation of risk (to society, firm & World Etc.

All this leaves us 2) unstable (to USAF, JCS, and (b) likelihood of a "Type II "error" with respect to "prediction", "winning" and building (USAF NATO unavailable/unwinning/unstable INSTABILITY

Relate this to Naomi Klein, "Shock Doctrine Capitalism"

(+ "Don't let a crisis go to waste"
(Emanuel)

(Rapture — extinction of non-believers
(by divine will) = "Rapture"

conversion motivation
Millennium
(see Hyth + fears:
for Rapture, ethnic cleansing
of Jews and non-Reformists,
i.e. Christians)

(Wg [illegible] for CW extermination
by S.S. in WWII?

CLIMATE:

(as one (?) actually wants "catas." warming
(even if it will "benefit" certain regions!)

or (SIOP) or all-out NUC exchange (vs. general
or (most dangerous Wpn) for PROLIF US CS)

⇒ NO steps one term — but actually to avoid them is
attention be drawn "tox costly" in terms of optimal interests
to problem, not to of decision-making, the Power Elite
(costly) truths NOT (C. Wright Mills
taken (esp. mil, defense
not only contractors, nat. sec.
the Red, weapons, Party bosses, Comp.
Katrina; Climate; TOBACCO "

9-14-11 (6)

Rhodites

Human

- Human readiness to drink or brutalize in (or protect & subsume) massacre / extermination of "other" humans is much greater than most suppose.

- Human conscience to prevent & massacre — willingness & make effort or take risk by opposing official/group thinking (condoning it or tolerating it), risking loss of membership, official, moral, or safety — is much less, & less common, than almost anyone supposes

see South, apartheid/ expelling Roma/Jews

- Readiness of D's/leaders & risk social catastrophe (not exc. massacre: the feminist militant, depression) of the War
to (or rather than risk) anti-personal/small-group ant-Bank, failure, single-loss, blame, loss of office (Chinese, is much greater

Likewise, readiness of subordinates to inform, or ignore/fail to suppress or obstruct or refuse — (we beat members, & fail to criticize! BHO, GWB)

willingness to lapse or allow it is greater — very great! — than imagined.

Thus: USAF (JCS) [redacted] attack of (SIOP) forces during CW

b) Substitute "[redacted] non-surprise attack W/ pretense of dissimulation, assurance (like Japan, Pearl Harbor; Barbarossa? Sat offensive?)

big reduction in CW. authority

(too risky to be justified, absent any danger of S-F SU attack:

e.g. absence of ongoing US–SU [redacted] and conflict, or US FU vs. SU ally)

+ "not American."

(address [redacted] at RFK : C-II for this)

1. CF D-L vs. SU [redacted]:

good

Second-strike cap;

a good US FS cap. (or ideally, "optimal" or "not intuitively good" FS cap

NOT "2d-strike DL vs. SU FS cap."

(AJW) (for D-L, and (USAF)(Nitze) for Type-I Def.

Thus, the main reason, the driver, of the adequacy of AF/SAC forces + posture was NOT (AJW) its "second-strike cap" (cap. not no-warning

2nd strike" (AUW)

(This would have been important measure for US if, as AUW/USAF + HR warned, SU had had "strategic superiority" 1955, & when they wrote, in 1954-61 — if they had sought, threatened & obtained a FS cap. vs. US

R-290 for SU! ‖ (It was this important measure for SU then (+ later)

Less for China, which did not threaten US (& SU) — so its Type I deterrent was not strained — but SU's (which bluffed, dangerously!)

+ China didn't need Type II!

The South Bighorn shoot (+ E, in effect) — an error, & would say, from point of view of SU and survival of humanity! — guaranteed the maintenance of 2 D.M.'s during CW (despite Reyan/Khrushchev infusions at Reykjavik).

(I wrote, USAF was a deterrent bet to (guaranteed? made by bias, but to others) + SU bluffs (vs. Mid-East deterrent + posture, like China) creation of a US D.M.

Since 1989-91 end of CW, there has been (or is) no rationale or stay mutual "need" unilateral

for SAC or SIOP

except for US defense of Ukraine & Hungary

VAN Disappearance of the Deadly Connection.

first MIC, and invention of attributes of

building and deploying policies

(but what has kept ICBMs in US

(green?) || bunkers since (1964?) & since Trident II

accuracy = MX/MM CE cap.

Thus, US DM "could" be dismantled

with effect on US empire;

Likewise SU D.M.

and that has been cancelled from to France,

Japan, China... (Indian) (Pak) having a D.M.

Motives for new + old NWS to have nukes:

NOT only 1) to deter nuke attacks (esp. US)

(NOR only 2) to deter opponent: attempt?

for Indian-Pak, Israel +

Pak, Indian, NK, Israel Pak to: 3) to deter large conventional attacks

IRAN, NK, Israel, 4) to deter large any attacks (esp. US)

(Pakistan;

(Iraq: could have 3+4 would have to be eliminated to contain nations threatening

to elim. motives for a min def force

Criteria for forces have been chosen (McN) to justify a rational maintenance of current forces, at least (or, desired expansion) and to limit reductions (1962-63+ SURVIVABLE CAP. vs. "25% of ~~RAF~~, 50% using IN EACH LEG, ~~SV~~

(

OR PARITY, NO ENEMY SUP.

⇒ "threat" to Europe + Berlin

-no Russian need to suppress East Eur uprising!

With -no Russian "umbrella" over Allies, hostilities

-no "threat to West Europe or "Berlin"!

-no reason no ~~SU~~ R provoke war thru temptation

-no realistic reason for ~~SU~~ R to "bump" US cap.

-no reason for US to fear or believe (evidence of) ~~SU~~ Russian temptation, or use.

(Need for US to bump)

(Both sides can still have false alarms in otw, and irrational choice to bump)

based on some uncertainty, here D-L cap., for each)

Russia has no "need" other than temptation (~~point~~ of origin of bump) + MIC inertia for its DM or RSAC.

Now does US (or with its "umbrella" against non-Russian threat: SK, Japan, Taiwan?

The US D.M. was created inadvertently
as a result of USAF FS "wrds" ~~x~~ ~~xxx~~
~~xx~~ ~~xxx~~
NOT a need to detect SU FS
(in 1945 —
NOR TO respond to it, with
S-S CF D-L
NOR to assist after SU FS

(~~xxxx~~ a reality-based concern
until SU orbited some satellites,
anti-satellites;
but even when it was finally found,
this was never the main concern
or focus-and-posture-driving
function for USAF,
compared to FS sats. vs. SU
ground-launched sats
- esp. or limited US FS,
based on LOW ~~xxxxx~~ of
missiles and COW/Extents on Warning

(When was it anticipated that Extents over would be given ~~xxxxx~~ relative to "warning"? Only after arrival of ~~xxxxxxx~~? NO

not only based for
detection, or Positive
Control

Granted, the whole COW/Positive Control was a costly system, ~~xxxxx~~ a costly gesture to and for and ~~xxxxxxx~~ difficulty (A-270) of Type I detection

vs. bare-warning attacks.

Wf did take on in mid SAC
by the basis of 10-minute / 15-min. alert?

(or in alert?)

(after Sept. '61, or before?

XCOM

Hyp: You commit under cover of CNN (FU)
or hamptons or SIOP esc-SIOP

look reasonable, counter considers
(threaten as a credible non-nuclear strategy)
if that's needed
and it is, for a large force!
i.e. to justify it domestically,
you have to believe in scenarios, contrary to
Rhodes, that a credible-enough FS threat
must look not-deterring/blackmail work.)

UNLESS you also have a hamptons
motive — some second reason to fear
a report that a failure to attack (FS) will open
some worse efforts the FS will:
because it will limit, encourage,
lead to a second, no-warning SU FS.

(attacks) That requires both sides to have some fears
embodied to the other! (Because SU FS has to have a
hamptons warning, too)

this instability — a matter / function of mutual power, the cap. and vulnerabilities / limits of each/both sides! —

we to Austr. Gr
stay of
USA
on SS-18

is necessary for credibly rational
FS plans + funds + operation
by either side (i.e. Australia US)

If one side (50) doesn't have the cap.
and inventive — but does have some
survivable 2d-strike cap — the other doesn't
have a credible/rational FS threat
or cap. (can that can be "used" to its
leaders in a crisis, to blackmail,

(our detriment of China, NK, Pakistan
vs. US FS or FU a counter-cf attack)

(R does a handshake: we have a pretty good
(better?) CF cap. esp. on the submarines.
+ all of the ICBMs. If they totally disarmed unilaterally, of
our reduced quantity, would they be
(to Kruzjan) strongly safer for attack?
Well, if they were on Austria...?
(But we used them as "potential enemy":
like China.
for an MIC, USAF, NATO rule...
(Shouldn't to have?)

After Iraq, Afghan, Pak, Kabul, + Iran NVN (Jan 31)
we don't invade mainland SV / Thais first
& NFZ (but alone, "against surface attack" ?
see Iran) (& Iraq!)
We have to invade Iran if air attacks
or wipe ground attacks & support
(like NK, Pak, Iran, Iraq — and above!)

(Ukraine, Arab & Iraq it go up over?
Libya? Iraq (could SH have gotten the
after 1991? Prob. not) (Could Libya? Prob. not)

Will Egypt vote this? "
Sanctions? (if Iran/Iraq)

√ You could/can't make SIOP-C2 "rational" to support
under any circumstances
ever using but riposte, nuclear with—
Precedent, criminal, evil, sinful, depraved,
Deplorable (what epithet, or other negative
would be "too weak," or derogatory?
Thomas: "Not a good plan. Not the American way."
What of thwarting it, fighting it, resisting it (like)
In what sense less bad than overt/forward
it? "Hardjob"; reformers
no one notices inconsistency
or need to radically change existing plans?
Now note notion MCN's criticism one multi-provincial

new written requirement 1983-87... some time or end of CW?